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Ontological Status on the Semantics Objects of Divinity: Meinongian Ontology Approach

Abstract. This study explores the ontological nature of semantic entities, particularly those categorized as non-existent, such as deities. It delves into the challenge posed by the principle of individuation within the realism-anti-realism debate, focusing on the philosophical viewpoints of concretism. Employing a blend of philosophical inquiry and literature review, the research aims to reexamine contemporary discussions on the philosophy of divinity and redefine the ontological status of religious semantic objects. Primary data are sourced from the seminal works of Alexius Meinong and Meinongian scholars concerning semantic object ontology. The findings suggest that believers adopt a realist stance towards their divine beliefs, necessitating an ontological commitment to the existence of God. However, the construction of divinity occurs within the realm of consciousness, with the object of representation existing independently of the mind while its content is determined by mental processes.

Key words: Concretism, Meinongianism, ontological status, ontological commitment, semantic's object

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Онтологический статус семантических объектов божественности: мейнонгианский онтологический подход

Аннотация. В данной работе исследуется онтологическая природа семантических сущностей, особенно тех, которые относятся к категории несуществующих, таких как божества. Авторы углубляются в проблему, поставленную принципом индивидуации в дебатах реализма и антиреализма, уделяя особое внимание философским точкам зрения конкретизма. Используя сочетание философских исследований и обзора литературы, исследование фокусируется на переосмыслении современных дискуссий о философии божественности и переопределении онтологического статуса религиозных семантических объектов. Первичные данные взяты из основополагающих работ Алексиуса Мейнонга и мейнонгианских учёных, посвящённых онтологии семантических объектов. Результаты показывают, что верующие занимают реалистическую позицию в отношении своих божественных убеждений, что требует онтологической приверженности существованию Бога. Однако построение божественности происходит в сфере сознания, при этом объект представления существует независимо от разума, а его содержание определяется психическими процессами.

Ключевые слова: конкретизм, мейнонгианство, онтологический статус, онтологическая приверженность, семантический объект

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Introduction

This study departs from the existence problem offered by the reism/concretism view. The general principle in this view is that only individual things exist [Lemanski, Dobrzański, 2020; Nolan, 2020; Werner, 2018]. The principle of individuation plays a crucial role in determining the ontological status of entities. Reism's perspective is criticized for the reductionism inherent in this principle. This reductionism is evident in its tendency to limit reality to concrete particulars or individual objects, neglecting the relational aspect of reality. This reductionist view has two main consequences: firstly, it excludes the use of conceptual frameworks and general principles to explain reality, leading to a tendency towards monism or naturalistic views. Secondly, it rejects references to non-concrete objects or those that do not conform to spatiotemporal individuation requirements. Consequently, statements are deemed meaningful only if they refer to concrete objects occupying space and time, rendering statements about divinity meaningless due to ambiguity in reference.

In this study, the debate about the ontological status of semantic objects will be placed on the tension between realism and antirealism. The main problem is the independence/dependence of the semantic object on the mind and consciousness [Alai, 2023; Macarthur, 2020; Rusu, 2020]. There is a thesis in the context of religious belief that every believer must have a realist attitude towards reality which is believed to exist. In other words, ontological commitment to the existence of reality or objects that are believed to exist is essential [Khasri et al., 2023].

Evaluating entities as a unified whole leads to the dismissal of objects that exist or are perceived as non-existent, deeming them unsuitable for linguistic reference. This monistic perspective is evident in concretism, which posits that only concrete entities have existence. This study adopts the object theory advocated by Alexius Meinong, which plays a significant role in discussions on object metaphysics and the philosophy of language, particularly within the analytical framework of religious studies/ analytic philosophy of religion. According to Baker [Baker-Hytch, 2016], Regarding methodology, the analytic philosophy of religion can be viewed as essentially an application of analytic metaphysics and epistemology. It utilizes methods such as thought experiments and intuition pumps, reasoning by analogy, and striving for reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theoretical principles.

Meinong's object theory presents a solution to the inflexibility of the monistic viewpoint by reclassifying objects, making them all suitable as references in linguistic contexts. The central aspect of Meinong's theory is the notion of subsistence, offering a rational and moderate approach to addressing the tension between existing and non-existing objects within the domain of object categories. In Meinong's philosophical framework, existence is viewed as a property that does not singularly determine an object's ontological status. By advocating for Meinong's concept of subsistence, this study supports the validity of objects typically labeled as non-existent, such as round squares and divine entities, as legitimate references. This perspective transcends the conventional mode of being in the referential theory of semantic objects, challenging the individualistic reductionism that governs the truth status of the referent.

The Problem of Object's Ontological Status

"Do numbers as a quantification of reality represent reality objectively?" [Azzouni, 2010]. Numbers, as something abstract, require descriptive explanation. However, the problem is that the numbers in the mind are very abstract and epistemologists tend to associate them with a priori models of knowledge. So, what causes the abstraction of numbers to seem relevant to real reality? For example, in conditions of scientific society that are dictated by positivism, especially logical positivism highly upholds the principle of measurability, or even postulates mathematical reality as the most capable of being equated with real reality.

In addressing Jody Azzouni's inquiry, ontological arguments that bridge mathematical abstraction and tangible reality can be developed by considering the categorical organization of objects. This study adopts the Meinongian tradition for such structuration. Similar to the Brentanian school, Meinong argues that objects encompass not only existing entities but also non-existent ones. Central to clarifying the structuring of object

categories is Meinong's fundamental conception of reality. To achieve clarity, Meinong's notion, stemming from the Brentanian tradition that everything is an object, must be linked with the debate between reism ontology and non-reism ontology. This debate is crucial for two main reasons. Firstly, it helps elucidate Meinong's ideas regarding facts and entities, particularly by addressing the question of what constitutes a fact. Secondly, it initiates an exploration of Meinong's foundational assumptions about reality and its relationship with human consciousness, which further informs the ongoing discourse between realism and non-realism in broader contexts, including religious contexts.

Elaborating on the significance of reism referring to the question above it is necessary to first refer to Brentano's reism [Woleński, 2022] for Brentano was a very influential figure in Meinong's thought. Brentano's Reism is rooted in Leibniz's view that the use of abstract words will be fatal because it will deal with complex problems regarding referential. In terms of ontology, Brentano departs from Aristotelian ontology. This is confirmed because Brentano involves a lot of categorical principles in his metaphysics which include substances, modifications, and conditions. Furthermore, Brentano revised Aristotle's categorical ontology by dividing being into entities (things) and non-existent *irrealia*–entities, and then dividing being into immanent objects, content, relations, and collectivities. All entities belonging to the *irrealia* category having the status of entia rationalism actually exist in the mind or are objects of thought. However, in the final phase of his thought, Brentano rejected the application of the categorical principle to the rationalist entity (*entia rationis*).

Brentano offers an ontological proposition with a reism orientation, that ontology must be based on equality. Furthermore, Brentano equates things with concrete-particular entities, so that entities–, or are later called objects– are determined by properties. Departing from this, Brentano divides things into two kinds, namely bodies (located in space and are temporal) and souls (only temporal).

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All entities belonging to the *irrealia* category – having the status of *entia rationalis* actually exist in the mind or are objects of thought. However, in the final phase of his thought, Brentano rejected the application of the categorical principle to the rationalist entity. These principles include intentional objects, immanent objects, conditions, the dualism of existence and non-existence, modality, relations, probability, universals, the dualism of space and time, Aristotelian forms, the content of judgments, and so on. Furthermore, Brentano equates things with concrete-particular entities, so that entities–, or are later called objects– are determined by properties. Departing from this, Brentano divides things into two kinds, namely bodies (located in space and are temporal) and souls (only temporal). There is nothing outside space and time. It was his rejection of *abstracta* of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, that is concrete particulars. Hence, there is no "thinking", but only "thinkers" [Taieb, 2023].

"Does our grasp of numbers or the concept of numbering really require an engagement with objects?" [Azzouni, 2010]. Numbers, as something abstract require descriptive explanation. However, the problem is that the numbers in the mind are very abstract and epistemologists tend to associate them with a priori models of knowledge. So, what causes the abstraction of numbers to seem relevant to real reality? For example, in conditions of scientific society that are dictated by positivism, especially logical positivism highly upholds the principle of measurability, or even postulates mathematical reality as the most capable of being equated with real reality.

Referring to Jody Azzouni's question above, ontological arguments that can bridge mathematical abstraction and real reality can be obtained by paying attention to the

categorical structuration of objects. In the context of this study, the structuration refers to the Meinongian tradition. Still in the same frequency as the Brentanian school, Meinong justifies that objects are not only about existing objects (existent objects), but there are also non-existent objects. Regarding the structuration of object categories, what needs to be clarified is Meinong's fundamental conception of what is actually real and what is not real. In achieving this clarity, Meinong's idea, which can also be said to be rooted in the Brentanian tradition that everything is an object, needs to be connected to the disputation between a reism ontology and a non-reism ontology. The involvement of the disputation is important for at least two reasons. First, as a step to clarify Meinong's ideas about facts and entities or by involving the question "What are facts and what are not facts?". Second, to start Meinong's basic assumptions about reality and the relationship between reality and the human mind and consciousness which will later be framed in a further discussion between realism and non-realism in general contexts and religious contexts.

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Intentional Semantics

In the study of religion, semantic discourse is an important thing that then gives rise to various problems surrounding the mechanisms of meaning in religion [Liu et al., 2022; Vestrucci, 2022]. In general, meaning in religion is symbolic, hidden (esoteric), and even revealing it requires an unusual spiritual experience (mystical experience) [Bronkhorst, 2022; Johansson, 2022]. According to Claude Lévi-Strauss, the binary structure of a myth is the meaning of the myth. Additionally, Stanley Tambiah argues that rituals in religions are "performative actions" that involve propositional content so they cannot be judged as true or false. And Sperber argues that symbols in religion are actually without meaning. This opinion was commented on by Frits Staal, that rituals do not have any meaning because they are performative actions. On the other hand, there is a popular opinion that states that meaning in religion is tied to the context of use [Penner, 1995].

According to Penner [Penner, 1995], semantic discourse in religious studies can be divided into two forms. First, regarding reference, namely the connection of statements, rituals, and symbols with the conditions or objects referred to. Penner emphasized that if the references to the concepts in religion can be explained, then the meaning of religion can be easily known. In other words, meaning in religion needs referential clarity. So, in this case, semantics depends on referential theory. This argument is part of the realism paradigm which demands clear correspondence between statements and the object/world stated. This correspondence theory is commonly used in the mainstream of modern religious studies, from Emile Durkheim to Victor Turner. The consequence of a realist attitude in this approach is that "not all words refer to certain conditions or objects", or more precisely, not all words refer to concrete objects/individuated objects/objects in the view of reism only individuals exist. Another consequence is that the concept of the world

understood as common sense can be drastically different from the mind-independent world that is intended to be referred to/discussed.

Second, namely the cohesion theory of meaning which is known as anti-realism. In general, this theory negates the referential principle and emphasizes the consistency and cohesiveness of ideas, symbols, archetypes, and so on. This kind of view is relevant to the idea of idealism which, if historically referred to, is rooted in Plato's idealism, that the world we experience is a mimesis of the world of ideas, or in other words is a replication of ideal forms that exist outside of sensory experience. The consequence of applying this theory is the possibility that a concept, belief, and so on is true or false.

Continuing the explanation of performative/propositional actions above, it is interesting to quote Austin's idea in Searle [Searle, 1968] that some forms of performatives can be judged as right or wrong for example, warnings. Every statement and description is the same as the act of promising or warning. Therefore, Austin concluded that statements, descriptions, and so on are other forms of equivalent illocutionary acts such as promises, commands, apologies, bets, and warnings.

Regarding the correspondence of truth to the world, this article refers to Davidson's statement in Penner [Penner, 1995], that truth (statements) do not always have to be correspond and cohesive. Realism and anti-realism should not focus on correspondence truth. Realism emphasizes non-epistemic correspondence, while anti-realism limits truth to what can be ascertained and revokes the role of truth as a standard of inter-subjectivity.

In the tension between realism and antirealism, the subject's relationality with the object (world) involves intentionality which then implies the questions: (1) How do intentionality and semantics work in the realism-anti-realism tension? (2) What is the relationship between meaning and the subject's intentionality? (3) What is the relationship between ontological commitment, epistemic attitude, and semantic object? These three questions are the fundamental problems of intentional semantics. In the tradition of the Philosophy of Language, among other philosophers of the Philosophy of Language such as Mill, Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein, only Husserl explicitly explained the basic concept of semantics which involves meaning in the influence of the intentionality of the subject as the speaker. For Husserl, language is essential in the expression of language-independent meaning. Language is a medium for representing the intentionality of subjects who use language. Genuine language different from mechanical or repetitive language use is characterized by expressive intentionality. For Husserl, understanding the meaning of language means being able to connect semantic actions as intentional actions with signs. In other words, the meaning of non-human symbols becomes possible [Orianne, 1976].

Husserl's ambition was to "clarify the independence of meaning and expression". According to Husserl, the main relationality between thoughts and words/statements, between meaning and expression, will be blurred if the expression is positioned as "non-productive", limited only to a reflection of meaning. The consequence of such a view is that all relationships between meaning and expression are accidental and unimportant. Referring to Chomsky's affirmation, the meaning of a statement in syntactic form, in general, cannot be derived from the meaning of its constituent elements and general formation rules. This argument makes it clear that building-block or atomistic theories of language are not suitable for semantic theory so there is no total independence of meaning from expression. In Husserl's context, the radical dichotomy between meaning and sign is related to the rejection of the realm of "sidelining" the social and communicative aspects of language. However, Husserl remained committed to the view that language is essentially private [Orianne, 1976].

Elaborating on the criticism of Husserl above, Quine's criticism of intentionality can be an important alternative. Quine offers the idea that all theories of language based on intentionality must believe in the existence of a private dimension of language. Apart from having ontological consequences, Quine's theory also has implications for the concepts of intersubjectivity, culture, and society. However, Quine's criticism faces a paradoxical challenge, in that his criticism remains within the framework of modern assumptions about the character of conceptualization and intersubjectivity. In his rejection of intentionality, Quine considers that mentalism in semantics is not limited to theories that position meaning as a mental object. According to Quine, semantics is distorted by

mentalism however, Husserl was not a mentalist. This distortion occurs when semantic operations are assumed to be determined by the mind, beyond what is implied in the external mental domain. Quine's view is relevant to the traditional view which states that true meaning is an abstract object that rolls over the locus of expression, not in the domain of the speaker. For example, Frege distinguished between the objective meaning of an expression and the subjective ideas in the mind of the utterer. This is certainly different from Husserl's view which emphasizes that meaning is derived from the intentionality of the speaker. Referring to Frege, everyone may have the same meaning about x, but not the same idea [Orianne, 1976].

Alexius Meinong's Object Theory

There are two basic theses offered by Meinong through his idea of Object Theory (*Gegenstandstheorie*), namely (1) there are objects that do not exist and (2) every object that does not exist is an object that has not been formed in various ways so that it can be used as a subject of predication. correct. In the tradition of traditional metaphysics, in treating both existing and subsisting objects (*bestehen*), traditional metaphysics tends to ignore objects that simply do not have the quality to exist. Therefore, according to Meinong, there needs to be a more general object theory [Chisholm, 2006].

Everything is an object, regardless of "whether something is thinkable" – if an object is unthinkable, then that does not mean that the object has no properties at all. At the very least, the object has properties that make it unthinkable and whether or not an object exists or has the character of another being. Thus, every object has characteristics regardless of whether the object has the quality of being or not. In other words, Meinong tries to conceptualize a theory of objects that is general and goes beyond ontic status. According to Meinong, the *Sosein* (character) of every object is independent of *Sein* (being). Meinong uses the supposition example of a round square or a round square which has *Sosein* because a round square by itself already has the character of a circle and a square/circle and a grid. However, still, a round square is an impossible object because the characteristics of its constituents are contradictory to its Sein, or in other words, these two characteristics hinder *Sein* [Chisholm, 2006].

The objectivism ethos in the Western world has had a significant influence on the emergence of the New Atheism movement [Cotter, 2021; Korostichenko, Klimov, 2023]. To trace its influence, the researcher wants to present some academic work that focuses on Meinong. But not directly related to the problem of atheism. One of them can be seen in the article by Bruno Langlet [Langlet, 2014] which attempts to map Meinong's resistance to reflection. The article explains that the subject's capture of the object in intention requires in-depth attention to the differences between Brentano and Meinong regarding Gegenstandstheorie. For Brentano, especially through his main thesis about intentional inexistence, he emphasized that every mental phenomenon has an inherent objectivity in the phenomenon itself (Gegenständlichkeit). In Brentano's context, objectivity refers to the representational properties of objects that the subject is aware of. Brentano's opinion is rarely found explicitly in Meinong's works, except his work entitled *Über emotionale Präsentation* which was published in 1917 where Meinong focuses on the status of objectivity of representation. However, Meinong rejected the absolute validity of Brentano's proposition in his thesis. According to Meinong, representation is an action that is a modification of the mind which includes particular content and the subject's intentional object.

However, a representation in which there is content (object) cannot be identified with a condition where the content of the representation is a representation of the object. Such conditions can occur when the subject has a direct relation towards the object and has an effective presentation of the object. Directedness (*Gerichtetsein*) and presentation (*Präsentation*) are internally related to each other. Meinong makes a distinction: although every representation is a condition where in the subject's mind there is already understanding or awareness of the object, the mind will be able to capture and touch the object if representational content actually and actively leads towards the object. Through this emphasis, we can place the presentative experience as an object or actually reference the object. In simple terms, through *Gegenstandtheorie*, Meinong emphasizes that all types of representation are related to objects, although it can be said that there will definitely be

representations without objects – namely representations without actual objects or objects that exist – meaning, as well as objects that cannot be reached [Langlet, 2014].

1. Auβersein, Quasisein dan Sosein

Meinong's doctrine of the *Auβersein* of a pure object is based on a semantic domain that is ontologically neutral. This concept can be used as an answer to the objections of extensionalists in the semantic tradition. For extensionalists, objects that do not exist or subsist cannot be used as true objects of reference or predication. In other words, anything that does not exist can never have any properties. As an example, we can refer to the supposition about the golden mountain and the square circle. For extensionalists, these two presuppositional objects do not exist in reality so we can't state them as meaningful statements. Therefore, all the properties that are tried to be attached to the golden mountain or the square circle are invalid and cannot be justified [Jacquette, 2015].

Auβersein is an outside being, namely a condition that is not part of the ontological assessment of an object, but is an extra-ontology of an object that does not exist (non-existent object). In other words, objects are understood as entities that are independent of their ontic status. Meinong describes *Auβersein* as a concept that transcends being and non-being. This concept also exists as a response to metaphysical problems regarding intentional objects. Meinong therefore concludes that intentional objects can be referenced regardless of their ontic status [Jacquette, 2015].

Meinong makes an expression to explain the offer of the *Auβersein* concept, namely by presupposing a condition which he calls *Quasisein* or almost-being, namely the minimum condition to support correct predication about properties – including the modal being reality and existence. The previous description confirms the impression that Meinong is indeed seeking liberation from the tyranny of being in semantic philosophy. In the context of liberation, Meinong attributes the *Quasisein* category to what he calls being-less objects. In other words, *Quasisein* is intended as a concept that can mediate or moderate between being and non-being. Simply put, *Quasisein* refers to an intentional object that does not refer to the spatio-temporal world or the Platonic abstract world. So, as long as something has a semantic presence, it can be said to be a true or meaningful object of reference and predication. Regarding intentional objects, Meinong states that unapprehended and unintended objects also have properties that make them worthy of being called intentional objects. That object is referred to as *Sosein*. Any existent or non-existent in the Meinongian tradition, or even an object that is not at all intentional or intentional, can fall into the reference domain of *Auβersein* semantics insofar as it corresponds to a unique constitutive property character [Jacquette, 2015].

2. Implexive Being (*Implecto of Being*)

In his work entitled *Über Möoglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie*, Meinong introduces the difference between implexive being and non-being. He uses the concepts of implexive being and non-being to explain universal metaphysics and as a contribution to the theory of reference and perception. The word "implexive" is a derivative of the Latin word "*implecto*" which means to weave, to weave or twist into, involve, involve, intertwine, or embrace [Jacquette, 2015].

Meinong explained that in incomplete objects or in German it is called *unvollständige Gegenstände*, there is an implexive being. This condition means that the incomplete object has the property of being which is related to complete objects. On the other hand, incomplete objects also have implexive non-being, where they can be said to be related to beingless objects. To understand metaphorically what Meinong means by complete and incomplete objects, we can refer to Meinong's efforts in expanding the concepts of implexive being and non-being towards the concept of implexive so-being (implexive *Sosein*). According to Meinong, in *Sosein*'s implexive condition, an incomplete object (beingless incomplete objects) has a constitutive property (*konstitutorische Bestimmung*). The reason is that the incomplete object is at the same time embedded in other objects where *Sosein* has properties [Jacquette, 2015].

Object Beyond Existence

Referring to Meinong's object theory, existence is positioned as a property. Consequently, existence should not determine objects. That is, an object is referred to as an object not based on whether or not it exists in the world. Referring to Meinong's object

theory, the transcendence of existence can be elaborated through a mode of being called "implexive being" or "linkage of being".

Assessment of objects as a monistic whole is the cause of rejection of objects that are subsist or even considered non-existent, where all of them are not worthy of being used as a linguistic reference. The monistic view can be seen in the doctrine of concretism which believes that only concrete entities exist. In this case, Meinongian approach is very helpful in clarifying the ontological commitment to non-concrete objects, subsist objects, and most importantly providing a discourse for the theism and atheism debate. The provision of this discourse space is an important offer of this research. However, there is a general view that properties cannot stand alone, so there is a dualism between properties and objects, where each property is a prerequisite for the existence of the object. Even if a property stands alone and is treated as an object (as in the case of OOO), then its ontological status is no more than a non-existent object or a fictional object, both of which have no content (contentless). The main reason is because the referenced object is abstract.

If fictional objects are judged to be contentless objects, then why is semantic construction referring to them still possible? In the semantic domain, the objects referred to are sensuous objects or sensuous properties. In this case, properties are also classified as objects, as is common in Object Oriented Ontology (OOO). One of the representatives of OOO is Graham Harman. According to Harman, the world is very unpredictable and unconventional realm. This is exemplified by his choice to start and end "Guerrilla Metaphysics" with a vivid and somewhat unsettling portrayal of a carnival. In his view, the world can be likened to a "carnival of things", characterized by its abundance of strange and extraordinary occurrences [Salem, 2017]. Harman argues that reality is object-oriented [Harman, 2011]. In the OOO metaphysical tradition, there is the term object set, where a collection of objects accumulates into one cumulative object without losing the status of the constituent objects. This means that what occupies particular and universal space are both called objects. For example, the intentionality of someone attending a circus event leads to the object of the circus. However, a circus object is a set of objects or a collection of objects composed of other objects. Another example is in the case of apples. The apple as a universal object is an object and its other properties sweet, sour, crunchy, rotten, and so on are also nothing but an object.

Researchers involve a framework (OOO framework) to tidy up the categories of objects scattered in the Meinongian Jungle. The biggest question in promoting the Meinongian approach to building theism is the elaboration of three aspects, namely God, existence, and fictional objects. These three aspects represent the objects of debate on theism and atheism. A fictional object can be thought of as an idea about a thing, assuming that every supposition or thought is always directed at something that is nothing other than an object, regardless of its ontic status. In this case, fictional objects can be said to represent sensual qualities that correlate with real objects (along with their substantial properties), but do not represent the entire real object. However, in this discussion, it needs to be agreed that God (God Himself) is a real object that cannot be represented by language. Herein lies the uniqueness and challenge of theists.

The main objection to non-existent and fictional objects is the missing link between the universal and particular individuals, where particular individuals are often associated with concrete objects. If drawn into the context of the ontology of Meinongian objects, existence which is generally used as an explanation of factual conditions, is positioned by Meinong as a predicate. In other words, the position of existence is the same as a property. In terms of object categories, of course, there is a debate "Can divine objects be equated with non-existent objects?" For believers, this is impossible because they have an ontological commitment to divine objects. However, a divine object also cannot be said to be an object that has an inferior mode of being (subsistence).

Theistic realists presuppose a mind-independent object [Byrne, 2017], in which God as a semantic object is also included. However, treating God as a semantic object is certainly not the same as assuming that the divine object is completely represented by semantics constructed through the mind and consciousness of the subject. God as a real object remains mind-independent because substantive properties are semantically impossible to represent. That is, divine semantics do not refer to or represent substantive properties, but only refer to and represent sensual objects that are aggregated by non-substantive properties.

Meinongian Semantics

According to Penner, broadly speaking, semantic discourse in religious studies can be divided into two forms [Penner, 1995]. First, referential matters, namely the connection of statements, rituals, and symbols with the condition or object being referred to. Second, the theory of cohesion of meaning is known as anti-realist. In general, this theory negates the referential principle and emphasizes the consistency and cohesiveness of ideas, symbols, archetypes, and so on. Metaphysically, religious realism is appropriate to be involved in the discourse of the semantics of divinity. Religious realism is a metaphysical tenet that shows that divine reality exists. This then becomes a principle for ontological attitudes about the objects of religious belief and religious language, including the contingent (independent) existence of the subject's thoughts, actions, and attitudes [Scott, Moore, 1997].

At the analytic level, the ontological debate about the existence of God in the ontological problem of divinity that is discussed in the theological domain needs to be expanded to semantic issues so that the direction of the discussion is more focused on "how to talk about reality", not just on claims of "direct access to reality", especially divine reality. However, of course, the main challenge in implementing this strategy is the general tendency of analytical philosophy which tends towards atheism. In other words, semantic constructions and other propositional actions are faced with the dilemma of attitudes regarding stated reality. This relates to one of the formulations of the research problem, namely "Is it possible for a believer to take a realist and anti-realist attitude at the same time?". The logical consequence is that there needs to be clarity about the boundaries and correlations between ontological commitment and epistemic attitudes which then imply the ontological status of semantic objects and the epistemic status of statements that refer to objects outside the natural/supernatural world. Therefore, this research formulates the correlation of ontological commitment and epistemic attitudes in the following figure:

Fig. 1. Correlation between Ontological Commitment and Epistemic Commitment.

Referring to Figure 1, then in the semantic domain/domain of the influence of mind and consciousness, meaning is congruent with performative attitudes which involve propositional acts. Consequently, meanings, concepts, religious language, and religious symbols cannot be judged as right or wrong. The main reason is that divine meaning is constructed through propositional action under the determination of mind and consciousness. If expanded, the meaning of divinity as part of propositional action implies a plurality of interpretations. This plurality of interpretations is also a hermeneutical consequence of "thinking subjects" whose existence is bound up in the influence of history, fusion horizons, and cultural formations.

Objects such as God, gods, unicorns, dragons, angels, or even the concepts of justice, equality, love, evil, and so on are referred to as extraordinary objects, and not as fictional objects. However, an infinite number of objects need to be categorized so as not to be trapped in the naivety of existence-nonexistence dualism. The intentionality of the subject over objects does not generally prove that all of them are objects but with different levels of being (mode of being). Referring to the Meinong object theory, there are constitutive properties attached to ordinary objects and refer to human capacities. The corporeal human capacity becomes a constitutive property reflexivity. In other words, nongeneral objects like unicorns have constitutive properties inherent in concrete or general objects. An example is the horsemanship nature of horses in the real world.

In the case of divinity, the constitutive property is reflected in the corporeality of human capacities and makes possible the confluence of knowledge about God. For example, in the *via-negativa* approach, it is the nature of God that is recognized by the subject, not God in Himself. Another constitutive property is "space" which allows assumptions about the reality of divinity in the corridor of corporeality or bodily aspects, such as inner-outer, internal-external, mind-body, and so on. For example, the attributes for recognizing God are related to the concept of space, such as God occupying a place or not being bound by place at all; God gives grace as a consequence of God the Most Compassionate where mercy is an entity outside the subject (external entities). This shows that the construction of knowledge about God the exception of the divine model with presential knowledge is at the semantic level which involves the mind and consciousness of the subject and is then connected affirmatively with experience.

Conclusion

There are difficulties with the Meinongian categorization model, especially in its application in mapping the ontological status of divine semantic objects including religious statements and religious language in general namely in solving the problem of distinctions and relationships between real objects, subsist objects, and fictional objects. Moreover, in the context of divine philosophy, a quite serious and risky question concerns the consequences of the Meinongian categorical principle in explaining divine semantic objects. If detailed, clarification is needed regarding the ontic status of the divinity semantic object, "Can the semantic object of divinity be called a real, subsist, or fictional object?".

Therefore, Meinong's object theory cannot be applied naively to justify the ontological status of divine semantic objects. Every theist must take a realist stance, thereby implying an ontological commitment to the existence of God. With this ontological commitment, God with the attributes attached to him are two different things. God himself exists in a world that is independent of mind and consciousness, while the attributes and meanings of God exist in the domain of subjectivity. If Meinong's subsistence theory is applied to justify the ontological status of divinity semantic objects, then God exists in limited conditions and will certainly undermine the ontological commitment that has been built. Therefore, what subsists is divine property, not God himself.

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