



Религиоведение. 2024. № 2. С. 179–187.
Religiovedenie [Study of Religion]. 2024. No. 2. P. 179–187.

DOI: 10.22250/20728662_2024_2_179

Risalatul Hukmi¹, Taufiqurrahman²

^{1,2} Universitas Gadjah Mada

^{1,2} 69HJ+F8P Jl. Olahraga, Karang Malang, Caturtunggal, Kec. Depok, Kabupaten Sleman, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia

¹ risalatulhukmi@gmail.com; ² philtaufiq@ugm.ac.id

Framing Radicalism: Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice in Indonesian Religious Discourse

Abstract. This paper delves into the intricate relationship between anticipatory epistemic injustice and the discourse surrounding religious radicalism in Indonesia. Recognizing that the anticipation of radicalization plays a pivotal role in shaping public perception and government policies, this study critically examines how epistemic injustices manifest in the framing of religious radicalism within Indonesian society. This study underscores the importance of recognizing and addressing anticipatory epistemic injustice in discussions surrounding religious radicalism in Indonesia. By promoting fair and just discourse, grounded in evidence and sensitivity to cultural and religious differences, we can contribute to a more balanced and effective approach to countering extremism while upholding democratic values and human rights.

Key words: radicalism, epistemic injustice, epistemology, hermeneutics

Рисалатул Хукми¹, Тауфикуррахман²

^{1,2} Университет Гаджа Мада

^{1,2} 55281, Индонезия, Джокьякарта, Слеман, Депок, Чатуртунггал, Каранг-Маланг, ул. Олахрага, 69HJ+F8P

¹ risalatulhukmi@gmail.com; ² philtaufiq@ugm.ac.id

Освещение радикализма: антиципация эпистемической несправедливости в индонезийском религиозном дискурсе

Аннотация. Данное исследование фокусируется на сложных взаимосвязях между антиципацией эпистемической несправедливости и дискурсом, касающимся религиозного радикализма в Индонезии. Признавая, что антиципация радикализации играет важную роль в формировании общественного восприятия и правительственной политики, авторы работы критически рассматривают особенности проявления эпистемической несправедливости в обрамлении религиозного радикализма в индонезийском обществе. Это исследование подчёркивает важность признания и устранения антиципационной эпистемической несправедливости в дискуссиях, касающихся религиозного радикализма в Индонезии. Содействуя справедливому и честному диалогу, основанному на доказательствах и чувствительности к культурным и религиозным различиям, мы можем способствовать более сбалансированному и эффективному подходу к борьбе с экстремизмом, при этом соблюдая демократические ценности и права человека.

Ключевые слова: радикализм, эпистемическая несправедливость, эпистемология, герменевтика



Risalatul Hukmi



Taufiqurrahman

Introduction

Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority country, is renowned for its cultural diversity and religious pluralism. However, in recent years, it has faced significant challenges related to religious radicalism and extremism. The discourse surrounding these issues has become a prominent aspect of Indonesian society, shaping public perceptions and government policies. This paper explores a critical dimension of this discourse by examining the concept of anticipatory epistemic injustice in the framing of religious radicalism within the Indonesian context.

Lee [Lee, 2021] defines “anticipatory epistemic injustice” as a conceptual framework that addresses the wrongs individuals can endure when they face anticipated challenges in their pursuit of sharing testimonies and knowledge. This notion represents an important addition to the evolving taxonomy of epistemic injustices. It acknowledges that individuals and institutions can hold preconceived notions, biases, and stereotypes that influence their expectations and assessments of others, particularly within the context of religious radicalization. In this context, anticipatory epistemic injustice encompasses the unjust treatment that individuals may experience as a result of being pre-judged or stigmatized due to their religious affiliations or beliefs.

This concept draws inspiration from Miranda Fricker’s foundational work on epistemic injustice, which highlights the various ways individuals can be unfairly treated in their roles as both knowers and conveyors of knowledge. While Fricker’s typology includes well-known forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, anticipatory epistemic injustice distinguishes itself by focusing specifically on the harms that arise from anticipatory judgments and assumptions, rather than solely on the act of conveying or receiving testimony [Lee, 2021].

In Indonesia, the anticipation of religious radicalism is an issue of paramount importance, closely intertwined with the nation’s pursuit of religious moderation as a means to prevent radicalization. The urgency of this matter emanates from the country’s richly diverse religious landscape, which is characterized by a vibrant tapestry of beliefs and practices, reflecting the multifaceted nature of its societal norms and values. While the overwhelming majority of Indonesians steadfastly adhere to a moderate and inclusive form of Islam, there have been deeply troubling instances of extremism and violence, which have been attributed to certain factions and groups that have been labelled as radical. These incidents have prompted the Indonesian government to take proactive measures aimed at addressing these concerns and fostering religious tolerance and harmony.

However, as we delve deeper into the intricate discourse surrounding religious radicalism, it becomes strikingly evident that anticipatory epistemic injustices are not mere peripheral concerns but are central in shaping narratives and molding perceptions. Media portrayals, government documents, and even everyday public discussions are not always neutral due to political interests or unbiased conveyors of information. Instead, they often exhibit deeply entrenched biases and perpetuate stereotypes, sometimes inadvertently and at other times, deliberately [Pratista, Herdiansyah, 2022]. Such skewed representations can lead to the unwarranted stigmatization of specific religious groups or individuals. This is not just a matter of misrepresentation; it has real-world implications. When certain groups or individuals are consistently portrayed in a negative light, it can lead to their marginalization, creating an environment where they are viewed with suspicion or outright hostility. This, in turn, can potentially exacerbate already existing tensions within Indonesian society, leading to further divisions and misunderstandings. It’s imperative, therefore, to approach the topic with a critical lens, recognizing and challenging these biases to foster a more inclusive and harmonious societal fabric.

This paper aims to shed light on the complex interplay between anticipatory epistemic injustice and the framing of religious radicalism in Indonesia. By critically examining how these injustices manifest within the discourse and exploring their implications, we seek to contribute to a more nuanced and balanced approach to addressing the challenges posed by extremism while upholding the principles of religious pluralism and social cohesion.

In the following sections, we will provide an in-depth analysis of anticipatory epistemic injustice within the Indonesian context, drawing from media representations, government policies, and scholarly literature. We will also propose strategies for mitigating these injustices to foster a more inclusive and informed discourse surrounding religious radicalism.

Epistemic Injustice in Religion

The intersection between epistemic injustice and religion has been recently discussed by some scholars¹. Anderson in her recent works on epistemic injustice proposed a critical examination of the potential consequences of conventional practices within the realm of philosophy of religion. Her work prompts us to reconsider how these

practices might unintentionally perpetuate various forms of epistemic injustice. Central to Anderson's argument is the insistence on cultivating a heightened sensitivity to factors like gender, race, one's "epistemic location", and embracing a more inclusive exploration of the diverse facets of religiosity. Such an approach is deemed imperative in achieving a more equitable understanding of what she terms "thinking subjects" and religious individuals who frequently grapple with marginalization, both in terms of their epistemic status and their social standing, particularly within the academic domain [Anderson, Clack, 2004].

Alongside Anderson feminist criticism, Kidd argued that religious identity often leads to the unfair judgments of others and involves activities and experiences that may be challenging for outsiders to comprehend. At the same time, it profoundly influences a person's way of acquiring and processing knowledge. In religious contexts, the acts of sharing and interpreting personal experiences can take on distinct forms. For instance, testimonial practices may demand a specific level of religious achievement, or understanding religious experiences may seem attainable only to those who possess genuine faith [Kidd, 2017].

Kidd contended that there is a substantial body of literature dedicated to exploring the potential negative consequences, not only in terms of ethics and social dynamics but also in the realm of knowledge, that can arise from religious institutions and traditions. Importantly, these criticisms often emanate from individuals who are themselves affiliated with these religious entities. This observation underscores the rich landscape of scholarship that examines the multifaceted impact of religious institutions and traditions on individuals and society at large. Within this body of literature, scholars and members of religious communities have delved into the complex interplay between belief systems, social structures, and the epistemic challenges that can emerge within religious contexts. By addressing these concerns from within, they contribute to a deeper understanding of the nuances and potential tensions inherent to religious belief and practice [Kidd, 2017].

Expanding upon Griffiths' concept of the "religious alien", Kidd presents a compelling argument that religion can serve as a potential source of epistemic injustice. The idea of a "religious alien" refers to someone who appears to embody or exist within a religious way of life that differs from one's own, and this concept serves as a critical lens through which to examine the dynamics of belief and knowledge within religious contexts. Kidd's argument revolves around the notion that when individuals encounter someone who seems to belong to a religious form of life that they themselves do not identify with or understand, it can create conditions ripe for epistemic injustice. This injustice may manifest in various ways, such as the dismissal of the religious beliefs or experiences of the perceived "alien", or the imposition of preconceived biases and stereotypes onto them [Kidd, 2017].

This type of religious alienation is exemplified by Sandberg and Colvin's research, which delves into the impact of narratives incorporating religious concepts such as *jihad*, *sharia*, *shahid*, *caliphate*, *kuffar*, and *al-Qiyamah* [Sandberg, Colvin, 2020], revealing how they can give rise to epistemic injustice. In a similar vein, Panchuk's study further explores the role of epistemic injustice, particularly hermeneutical injustice, within religious contexts, religious trauma, and spiritual violence. Panchuk contends that hermeneutical injustice can sometimes lead to spiritual and religious harm, while at other times, it fosters an epistemic environment conducive to spiritual abuse. In essence, these studies shed light on the multifaceted ways in which religious narratives and epistemic injustices intersect and impact individuals' spiritual and religious experiences, emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of these phenomena [Panchuk, 2020].

Epistemic injustice isn't limited to religious experiences; it's also prevalent in religious educational contexts. As Mercer argues, testimonial epistemic injustice involves the suppression or rejection of testimony due to biases, thereby denying the credibility and acknowledgment of a person's or group's voice. This injustice is particularly evident within faith communities and educational institutions, especially concerning children. Children often find their spiritual insights dismissed, primarily because of their age, which diminishes their perceived capacity for meaningful religious knowledge. Additionally, religious educators themselves may encounter this injustice. In educational settings, religious education is sometimes unjustly devalued as a less scholarly subject, leading to its marginalization when compared to core subjects like language arts or mathematics.

Critics of religious education may approach both the subject matter and its educators with skepticism, attributing them to ignorance, superstition, or the persistence of psychosocial needs. This demonstrates how testimonial epistemic injustice manifests within the realm of religious instruction [Mercer, 2022].

Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice, as delineated by philosopher Miranda Fricker, encompasses two primary forms. First, there is testimonial injustice, which occurs when individuals are unfairly treated in their capacity as knowers or conveyors of knowledge due to their social identity, such as gender, race, or age, leading others to doubt or dismiss their testimony. Second, hermeneutical injustice arises when individuals are unable to fully articulate or comprehend their experiences or perspectives because society lacks the necessary concepts or language to accommodate their narratives, effectively rendering their voices unheard and their stories untold. Both forms of epistemic injustice underscore the detrimental impact of biases and societal norms on the equitable exchange of knowledge and the fair treatment of individuals within the realm of epistemology [Fricker, 2011].

In the discourse on epistemic-injustice phenomena, a fundamental distinction is drawn between structurally-caused and agent-caused occurrences, although borderline cases, like expression-style exclusion and epistemic appropriation, exist [Bayruns García, 2022]. This differentiation hinges on the concept of a “causal story”, which serves as a criterion for evaluating the uniqueness of these phenomena. Structurally-caused epistemic injustice arises from societal organization, while agent-caused injustice stems from an individual’s actions, beliefs, or utterances. Additionally, the notion of “epistemic consequence” provides another criterion for differentiation. For instance, a person experiencing testimonial quieting or testimonial injustice may lose confidence in their intellectual abilities, representing an epistemic consequence [Dotson, 2011]. Likewise, when white supremacy’s influence on news sources undermines a person’s ability to justify inferences regarding racial injustice, it signifies a distinct epistemic consequence [Bayruns García, 2022]. While these two criteria do not encompass all possible distinctions among epistemic-injustice phenomena, they are pivotal for developing prescriptive approaches and remedies tailored to each phenomenon, with the understanding that differing causal stories and epistemic consequences often necessitate distinct strategies for redress.

The concept of anticipatory epistemic injustice is introduced as a distinct and significant form of epistemic injustice, separate from more conventional forms like testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. Anticipatory epistemic injustice, as proposed by Ji Young Lee, centers on the wrongs that individuals can experience in their roles as knowers, specifically concerning their engagement in testimony-sharing opportunities. What sets it apart is that it revolves around the harm caused by preconceived biases and prejudices, which anticipates and hinders individuals’ participation in knowledge-sharing interactions before they even begin [Lee, 2021]. In short, the very idea of this concept is that when something harmful is expected to happen, it should be avoided.

In Lee’s exploration of anticipatory epistemic injustice, three distinct cases are examined. The first scenario involves an individual who has undergone a religious experience but refrains from sharing their testimony due to the anticipation of societal stigma associated with those who report such experiences. In the second case, an LGBTQIA+ individual chooses not to come out to their social peers, driven by the anticipation of either experiencing internal shame upon sharing their truth or encountering external social stigma. Their decision to remain in the closet is rooted in their perception of potential negative consequences tied to revealing their identity. In the third case, during an interview, a survivor of sexual assault wrongly assigns blame to themselves for the trauma, instead of correctly attributing fault to the external circumstances that led to it. This self-blame prompts them to alter the content of their testimony, driven by the fear of losing control over the narrative of their life story. These cases collectively exemplify the various ways in which anticipatory epistemic injustice can manifest, illustrating the detrimental impact of preconceived biases and societal norms on individuals’ abilities to engage in truthful knowledge-sharing [Lee, 2021].

Lee draws a parallel between anticipatory epistemic injustice and Kristie Dotson’s concept of testimonial smothering. Testimonial smothering, according to Dotson, occurs

when marginalized individuals withhold or truncate their testimony out of fear that it will be misunderstood, particularly when they detect pernicious ignorance in their audience, meaning a lack of competence to understand the testimony accurately. Anticipatory epistemic injustice, however, differs in its causes. While testimonial smothering is driven by the speaker's perception of their audience's incompetence, anticipatory epistemic injustice can arise from various factors and may even occur when the audience is competent, lacks pernicious ignorance, and is sympathetic to the speaker's message [Goetze, 2021].

However, the attempt to distinguish testimonial smothering from anticipatory epistemic injustice, as argued by Bayruns García, falls short due to several key reasons. First, both injustices share similarities in their causation, stemming from structural aspects of society that diminish the likelihood of non-dominant subjects' testimony being properly received. Second, both involve speakers refraining from issuing or truncating the content of their testimony. Furthermore, Bayruns García highlights that even when the hearer possesses testimonial competence, social structures and context may still signal to the speaker that there's a significant likelihood of testimonial incompetence due to pernicious ignorance. Additionally, he notes that Dotson's framework does not require the speaker's judgment of the hearer's incompetence to be accurate. Finally, both injustices result in similar epistemic harms. Consequently, Bayruns García concludes that the cases presented by Lee are effectively instances of testimonial smothering, revealing that these two injustices are not as distinct as initially thought [García, 2021].

Responding to García's objection, Goetze contends that her argument lacks complete persuasiveness. While it's acknowledged that testimonial smothering can result from the speaker reasonably, albeit incorrectly, judging that their audience lacks or is likely to lack testimonial competence due to pernicious ignorance, there are other potential issues that the speaker might anticipate when providing their testimony. Bayruns García's observation that testimonial smothering and anticipatory epistemic injustice share significant similarities is valid. However, Goetze proposes a more promising perspective by suggesting that testimonial smothering falls under the umbrella of anticipatory epistemic injustice. In testimonial smothering, the anticipated negative outcome involves the audience's failure to comprehend the speaker's testimony due to perniciously ignorant testimonial incompetence. Yet, this is merely one specific anticipation that may lead a speaker to adjust their testimony or refrain from testifying altogether. Thus, anticipatory epistemic injustice is a broader phenomenon. While these two injustices are not entirely distinct, as Lee posits, they are not identical either, as Bayruns García suggests [Goetze, 2021].

Epistemic Injustice in Preventing Radicalism

In *Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies* (2018), Bayraklı and Hafez challenge the notion that Islamophobia can be solely explained by the majority-minority relationship and instead argues that power dynamics are crucial in understanding this phenomenon. They suggest various perspectives and approaches, including world-system analysis, post-colonial and decolonial viewpoints, racism, Orientalism, and self-Orientalization, to better comprehend Islamophobia in Muslim societies. They argued that some individuals who identify as Muslims in the West are involved in promoting Islamophobia, but they are often rejected by many other Muslims. In contrast, in Muslim-majority countries, governments and institutions are implementing discriminatory policies against politically opposing Muslims, often with significant support from powerful segments of society. These policies may even be justified using Islamic discourse, revealing the complexity of racism within an Islamic context [Bayraklı, Hafez, 2020].

In a similar vein to Zuhri's studies, he discusses how Islamophobia manifests in majority-Muslim societies like Indonesia, characterizing it as "regulated Islamophobia" intentionally propagated by political regimes. This strategy aims to shape the beliefs and aspirations of Muslims, promoting a specific interpretation of Islam while sidelining other, often conflicting viewpoints. The Indonesian government actively controls the interpretation of Islam, endorsing a state-sanctioned version amid a diverse range of interpretations, from liberal to conservative and sometimes radical. This control is implemented through policies, institutional initiatives, and projects that seek to strengthen loyalty and compliance with the state's agenda. The current regime has officially designated

“moderasi beragama” as the preferred form of Islam, all the while critiquing both liberal and conservative interpretations as it advances nationalistic goals and state-building endeavors [Zuhri, 2021].

What Zuhri so-called “regulated Islamophobia”, “moderasi beragama”, in many context related to the issue state’s program on “deradicalization”. This program is introduced by Indonesian government in 2012. The objective of this program is to employ a gentle approach to facilitate the rehabilitation of terrorists, their associations, and their families, effectively guiding them away from radical ideologies [Ulyana, Riyansyah, 2021]. The government depicts radicalism as an Islamic faction that diverges from the national ideology, Pancasila. This portrayal reflects a perception that certain elements within Islamic groups may pose a threat to the country’s secular and pluralistic values. As articulated by Hansen, radical Islamism encompasses those groups that endorse a totalitarian ideology with parallels to movements like Marxism and National Socialism. In this context, radical Islamism advocates for Islam not just as a religion but also as a comprehensive political system that should be adopted and implemented by the government [Hansen, Kainz, 2007].

In this paper, we argue that the persistent reproduction of the radicalism issue has resulted in the creation of a harmful and stigmatizing perception surrounding certain Islamic groups. This stigma, often fueled by misconceptions and misrepresentations, can have far-reaching consequences not only for the targeted groups but also for the broader societal fabric of Indonesia. The continuous association of these Islamic groups with radicalism can lead to their marginalization and exclusion from mainstream discourse and participation in various aspects of society. This exclusion may manifest in the form of social discrimination, limited access to educational and economic opportunities, and even legal restrictions. Consequently, these groups may face significant challenges in fully exercising their rights and engaging in civic life.

As shown by Fauzen, the frequent use of the terms “radical” and “radicalism” in contemporary social media has led to a negative association with Islam, unfairly portraying it as a religion that condones intolerance and violence. This negative labeling extends not only to Islam as a religion but also to individuals or groups critical of the government, often branded as radicals, anti-state-ideology, and pro-Islamic state by government supporters. While the majority of Indonesians, including Muslims, support Pancasila as the national ideology, these labels have created polarization and potential divisions within the country. Criticism appears to be unwelcome in Indonesia’s political landscape [Fauzen, 2021]. This labelling process leads to what Majesty and Prayoga called “from moderatism to Islamophobia” [Majesty, Prayoga, 2022], that is a phenomenon where the politics of deradicalization by promoting religious moderatism has created what we call “intra-Islamophobia”.

We argue that this form of Islamophobia generates an epistemic injustice stemming from preconceived assumptions. In essence, the labelling and demonization of certain Muslim groups as radicals are driven by a mindset of fear, anticipating events that have not yet occurred but are already subject to judgment. This anticipatory prejudice results in an unfair treatment of these groups, which can have significant consequences in terms of their social, political, and cultural integration. How does this epistemic injustice function? When we employ the label “radical”, we attempt to essentialize their identity in a way that simplifies their identification within social contexts. This can manifest in various aspects, such as their social interactions, organizational affiliations, and even their fashion choices. Such essentialization can lead to a reductionist view of individuals or groups, oversimplifying their complexities and unfairly categorizing them based on preconceived notions.

In light of this, it is essential to recognize that epistemic injustice and what Jenkins termed “ontic injustice” are intertwined. Jenkins defines ontic injustice as a situation where an individual is wronged merely by being socially categorized as a member of a specific social group. Being part of a particular social group entails experiencing certain social limitations and opportunities, some of which can be morally injurious to the individual [Jenkins, 2023]. It is precisely this categorization and stigmatization that contribute to testimonial injustice, wherein the testimony provided by individuals from these stigmatized groups is dismissed or discredited solely based on their identity. This form of epistemic

injustice arises because their voices are marginalized due to preconceived notions and stereotypes associated with their religious or social identity. Moreover, it extends to what Fricker terms “hermeneutical injustice”, where individuals are hindered from fully comprehending and expressing their experiences because the concepts and vocabulary used by the government and dominant societal narratives do not align with their own.

This intertwining of epistemic injustice and ontic injustice sheds light on the complex dynamics of how individuals are treated within society. Epistemic injustice, as we have discussed earlier, pertains to the unfair treatment individuals face in their capacity as knowers and conveyors of knowledge. It often occurs when preconceived notions, stereotypes, or biases lead to their testimonies being discredited or their perspectives marginalized. Ontic injustice, on the other hand, goes a step further by highlighting how individuals can be wronged by the mere act of belonging to a particular social category. This categorization subjects them to a set of social constraints and enablements that can lead to moral injury. In essence, ontic injustice underscores the systemic nature of injustice, where individuals face harm not because of their individual actions or choices but simply due to their social identity.

For instance, consider the case of racial profiling. When individuals from specific racial or ethnic groups are disproportionately targeted by law enforcement or subjected to discrimination solely based on their racial identity, they experience ontic injustice. This discrimination is not contingent on their individual behavior but is a result of societal biases and systemic racism. When epistemic injustice and ontic injustice intersect, we see how individuals from marginalized social groups not only face credibility deficits and marginalization in the realm of knowledge but also endure systemic wrongs in their daily lives. These injustices are deeply intertwined, as the stereotypes and biases that underlie epistemic injustice often contribute to the perpetuation of ontic injustice, reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Recognizing this interplay between epistemic and ontic injustice is crucial for addressing and dismantling systemic inequalities and biases in society. It underscores the need for comprehensive efforts to challenge stereotypes, promote empathy, and create inclusive environments where individuals are treated fairly, not just in the realm of knowledge but also in their lived experiences.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the endeavour to prevent radicalism is undoubtedly a paramount objective, particularly in a nation as diverse as Indonesia, where various religious and ideological perspectives coexist. However, it is imperative to recognize that the pursuit of this vital goal can inadvertently give rise to epistemic injustice – a phenomenon that undermines equitable knowledge-sharing and the fair treatment of different religious communities.

As explored in this discussion, several facets of counter-radicalization efforts have the potential to engender epistemic injustice. Blanket policies and surveillance measures can lead to testimonial injustice by unfairly stigmatizing particular groups, while selective law enforcement may discriminate against specific religious or ideological communities, creating disparities in knowledge-sharing opportunities. Media portrayals can perpetuate stereotypes, fostering prejudiced attitudes and undermining the voices of marginalized religious groups. Restrictions on religious freedom and a lack of representation can further isolate communities, hindering their ability to contribute to meaningful dialogue and equitable knowledge-sharing.

Therefore, a critical imperative emerges: the imperative to strike a delicate balance between safeguarding national security and preserving the principles of epistemic justice and inclusivity. This balance requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges the diverse religious beliefs and identities within Indonesia’s society. Policymakers and society as a whole must be vigilant in ensuring that counter-radicalization measures are fair, just, and respectful of the rights and dignity of all individuals and communities.

In essence, the prevention of radicalism should not come at the cost of perpetuating epistemic injustice. Instead, it should be guided by a commitment to upholding the values of inclusivity, equitable knowledge-sharing, and respect for the diverse perspectives that

enrich Indonesia's cultural tapestry. By carefully considering the potential ramifications of counter-radicalization efforts on epistemic justice, Indonesia can foster an environment where security concerns are addressed without compromising the fundamental principles of fairness and respect for all.

Acknowledgement

This research project was funded by Young Lecturer Research Grant Universitas Gadjah Mada Number 5985/UN1.P.II/DitLit/PT.01.03/2023.

Благодарность

Исследование финансировалось за счет исследовательского гранта для молодых преподавателей Университета Гаджа Мада, № 5985/UN 1.P.II/DitLit/PT.01.03/2023

References

1. Anderson P.S., Clack B. *Feminist philosophy of religion: Critical readings*. London: Routledge, 2004.
2. Bayraklı E., Hafez F. *Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies* (First issued in paperback). London: Routledge, 2020.
3. Bayruns García E. How Racial Injustice Undermines News Sources and News-Based Inferences. *Episteme*. 2022, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 409–430. <https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.35>
4. Dotson K. Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. *Hypatia*. 2011, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 236–257. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x>
5. Fauzen M. Implications of Labelling Radicalism on Indonesia Politics and Democracy. *Al-Imarah*. 2021, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 292–303. <https://doi.org/dx.doi.org/10.29300/imr.v6i2.5053>
6. Fricker M. *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing* (Repr). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
7. García E.B. On Anticipatory-Epistemic Injustice and the Distinctness of Epistemic-Injustice Phenomena. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*. 2021, vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 48–57.
8. Goetze T.S. Anticipation, Smothering, and Education: A Reply to Lee and Bayruns García on Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective*. 2021, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 36–43.
9. Hansen H., Kainz P. Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*. 2007, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 55–76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760601121648>
10. Jenkins K. Ontic Injustice. In K. Jenkins. *Ontology and Oppression* (1st ed., pp. 17-C1P80). New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197666777.003.0002>
11. Kidd I.J. Epistemic injustice and religion. *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*. London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 386–396.
12. Lee J.Y. Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. *Social Epistemology*. 2021, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 564–576. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306>
13. Majestyta N., Prayoga S.C. From Moderatism to Islamophobia: Indonesian Muslim identity discourse in Nurman Hakim's Islamicate film trilogy. *Contemporary Islam*. 2022, vol. 16, no. 2–3, pp. 449–473. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-022-00494-6>
14. Mercer J.A. Epistemic Injustice and Religious Education. *Religious Education*. 2022, vol. 117, no. 1, pp. 1–3. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2022.2030095>
15. Panchuk M. Distorting Concepts, Obscured Experiences: Hermeneutical Injustice in Religious Trauma and Spiritual Violence. *Hypatia*. 2020, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 607–625. <https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2020.32>
16. Pratista B.T., Herdiansyah A. G. Mencegah Perkembangan Populisme Islam: Analisis Wacana Kritis Terhadap Narasi Menteri Agama Tentang Radikalisme di Indonesia. *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam*. 2022, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 60–80. <https://doi.org/10.24042/tps.v18i2.14396>
17. Sandberg S., Colvin S. 'ISIS is not Islam': Epistemic Injustice, Everyday Religion, and Young Muslims' Narrative Resistance. *The British Journal of Criminology*. 2020, azaa035. <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa035>.
18. Ulyana Y.A., Riyansyah A. De-radicalization Program: The Case Study of Indonesia. *International Journal of Business, Economics, and Social Development*. 2021, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 78–88. <https://doi.org/10.46336/ijbesd.v2i2.130>.

19. Zuhri S. Regimented Islamophobia: Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia. *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)*. 2021, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 387. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8249>

Submitted for publication: October 18, 2023.
Accepted for publication: November 15, 2023.
Published: June 27, 2024.

¹ Pamela Sue Anderson (2004, 2012); Marije Altorf (2009); Michèle Le Doeuff (1989).